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Abstract
A defender-attacker-target problem with non-moving target is con-
sidered. This problem is modeled by a pursuit-evasion zero-sum dif-
ferential game with linear dynamics and quadratic cost functional. In
this game the pursuer is the defender, while the evader is the attacker.
The objective of the pursuer is to minimize the cost functional, while
the evader has two objectives: to maximize the cost functional and
to keep a given terminal state inequality constraint. The open-loop
saddle point solution of this game is obtained in the case where the
transfer functions of the controllers for the defender and the attacker
are of arbitrary orders. Then, this result is applied to the case of the
first order controllers for the defender and the attacker. Numerical
illustrating examples are presented.
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1 Introduction
In the present paper, we study a defender-attacker-target problem. This
problem is considered as a kind of interception problems, and it is modeled
by a pursuit-evasion differential game.
The topic of interception problems studies an engagement between two
moving vehicles. One of these vehicles tries to capture the other, while
the other second vehicle tries to avoid such a capture. We call the first
vehicle a pursuer, while the second is called an evader. Interception problems
have been considered in the literature in various settings. If the evader’s
behaviour is predictable by the pursuer, this problem can be formulated in the
framework of optimal control theory (see, e.g., (Bryson & Ho, 1975; Guelman
& Shinar, 1984; Glizer, 1997) and references therein). If the evader’s behavior
is unpredictable for the pursuer, the interception problem can be formulated
as a robust control problem (Glizer & Turetsky, 2012), or, in particular, as a
finite horizon pursuit-evasion differential game (see e.g., (Bryson & Ho, 1975;
Isaacs, 1965; Krasovskii & Subbotin, 1988; Shinar, Glizer, & Turetsky, 2013)
and references therein). The objective of the pursuer is to minimize the miss
distance (the closest separation between the vehicles), while the evader tries
to maximize this miss distance and thus to avoid the capture.
In a defender-attacker-target problem, a defender can be considered as a
pursuer, while an attacker can be considered as an evader. In such situations,
the avoiding of the capture is not the main aim of the evader, because it
tries not only to escape from the pursuer but also to hit an attacked object
(target).
A defender-attacker-target problem was studied in a number of works in
the literature. Thus in (Shaferman & Shima, 2010; Shima, 2011; Prokopov
& Shima, 2013; Weiss, Shima, Castaneda, & Rusnak, 2017), the defender-
attacker-target problem with a moving target was solved in the frame of
control theory. In these papers it is assumed that either the attacker knows
the controls of the defender and the target, or the defender and the tar-
get know the attacker’s control. Based on these assumptions, the original
problem was modeled by a linear-quadratic optimal control problem. Vari-
ous types of a such control problem were proposed for this model: with and
without hard controls’ constraints, with and without terminal part of the cost
functional, with and without integral part of the cost functional, with and
without terminal state constraints. If the above mentioned assumptions are
not made, the defender-attacker-target problem can be solved in the frame
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of differential games. Such an approach was proposed in the works (Lipman
& Shinar, 1995; Perelman, Shima, & Rusnak, 2011; Rubinsky & Gutman,
2014; Liang, Peng, & Li, 2016; Casbeer, Garcia, & Pachter, 2017; Li & Cruz,
2011). In (Liang et al., 2016), the case of a moving target is considered.
All the participants of the engagement have the simple kinematic equations
in a plane. Two differential games are proposed to model the engagement
from the defender and the target, and the attacker viewpoints. In each of
these games, the heading angles of the participants are their controls. In
the first game, the final range between the attacker and the target is the
cost functional. The terminal equality constraint is imposed on the final
range between the defender and the attacker. In the second game, the final
range between the defender and attacker is the cost functional. The termi-
nal equality constraint is imposed on the final range between the attacker
and the target. Both games were solved analytically. In (Casbeer et al.,
2017), two types of the defender-attacker-target problem, with one and two
defenders, were analyzed. In each type of the problem, the participants of the
engagement have the simple kinematic equations in a plane and their heading
angles are their controls. The duration of the game is not prescribed, and
the final time is the first time instant at which the separation of the defender
(or at least one of the defenders) and the attacker equals zero. The terminal
separation of the target and the attacker is the cost functional in the game.
Detailed analysis of these games was carried out. The game of kind, mod-
eling the original problem, also was analyzed in (Casbeer et al., 2017). In
(Rubinsky & Gutman, 2014), the original defender-attacker-target problem
was modeled by a differential game of kind, and this game was solved from
the attacker viewpoint. In this game the behaviour of the engagement’s par-
ticipants is described by linear differential equations with zero-order transfer
functions of the controllers, i.e., the lateral accelerations serve as the controls.
These controls are subject to hard constraints. Two final time instants, for
the defender-attacker engagement and attacker-target engagement, are given.
At each of these time instants, a state inequality constraint is given. One of
these constraints provides the avoidance of the capture of the attacker by the
defender, while the other provides the capture of the target by the attacker.
Conditions for the existence of the attacker’s control, solving this game, were
derived and the bang-bang attacker’s state-feedback control itself was de-
signed. In (Lipman & Shinar, 1995), the original defender-attacker-target
problem was considered in the case of non-moving target. This problem was
modeled by a differential game of degree. In this game the dynamics of the
3
defender and the attacker are described by linear differential equations. The
defender has the first-order controller, and its control is its lateral acceler-
ation command. The attacker has the zero-order transfer functions of the
controller, and its control is its lateral acceleration. Both controls are sub-
ject to hard constraints. The final time instants, for the defender-attacker
engagement and attacker-target engagement, are given. The first of these
time instance is the final time of the game. At this time instance, a state in-
equality constraint is given. This constraint is necessary for the capture of the
target by the attacker. The cost functional in this game is the miss distance
in the the defender-attacker engagement. The solution of this game yields
bang-bang optimal state-feedback controls for the defender and the attacker.
In (Li & Cruz, 2011), a classic finite horizon zero-sum linear-quadratic dif-
ferential game (without terminal state constraints) was applied to model a
defender-attacker-target problem in the following situations: (1) the target is
non-moving; (2) the behaviour of the target is known to the attacker and the
defender; (3) the target escapes from the attacker. In the general case of lin-
ear dynamics of the engagement’s participants, the existence of the solution
to the corresponding Riccati differential equation was assumed, while in the
case of the simple motion dynamics of the participants, conditions for such an
existence were derived. A linear-quadratic pursuit-evasion differential game
(without terminal state constraints) also was used in (Perelman et al., 2011)
as a model of a defender-attacker-target problem with a moving target. Each
participant of the engagement has a controller with an arbitrary-order trans-
fer function. For this game, the continuous-time analytic and discrete-time
numeric state-feedback solutions were obtained. These solutions present the
optimal evasion strategy of the target and the optimal pursuit strategy of
the defender, as well as the optimal strategy of the attacker for pursuing the
target and for evading the defender.
In the present paper, a defender-attacker-target problem with non-moving
target is considered. In contrast with the works (Shaferman & Shima, 2010;
Shima, 2011; Prokopov & Shima, 2013; Weiss et al., 2017), we assume that
the attacker and the defender do not know the controls of each other. In
such a case, it is impossible to use an optimal control problem as a model
of a defender-attacker-target problem. Therefore, we model this problem
by a differential game. Moreover, in contrast with (Rubinsky & Gutman,
2014), we consider the game of degree, and solve it from viewpoints of both,
defender and attacker, players. In this game, the dynamics of the defender
and the attacker are given by linear systems of differential equations. In
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contrast with the works (Liang et al., 2016; Casbeer et al., 2017; Rubinsky
& Gutman, 2014; Lipman & Shinar, 1995), where the control of the attacker
and/or the defender is either the heading angle, or the lateral acceleration,
or the lateral acceleration command, we consider an essentially more reason-
able from the practical viewpoint (and, therefore, much more complicated
from the mathematical viewpoint) controllers of the players. Namely, the
transfer functions of the defender’s and attacker’s controllers are of arbitrary
and different, in general, orders with scalar controls. No hard constraints
are imposed on these controls. The finite durations of the defender-attacker
engagement and attacker-target engagement are given. The first of these
durations is the game duration. The cost functional is a weighted sum of the
square of the defender-attacker miss distance and the finite horizon integrals
of the squares of the defender’s and attacker’s controls. The weights of the
first two terms in the cost functional are positive, while the weight of the
third term is negative. The cost functional is minimized by a proper choice
of the defender’s control and is maximized by a proper choice of the attacker’s
control. Thus, the considered game is a zero-sum linear-quadratic differential
game. However, in contrast with the works (Li & Cruz, 2011; Perelman et
al., 2011), where a classic zero-sum linear-quadratic differential game (with-
out constraints) was used to model a defender-attacker-target problem, we
impose a non-strict inequality constrain on the terminal state of the attacker.
This inequality is necessary for the attacker to capture the target. There-
fore, using this inequality in the game of the present paper, we convert this
game to a considerably more adequate model of a defender-attacker-target
problem.
It is important to note the following. If hard (geometric) constraints are
imposed on the defender/attacker control, then the corresponding optimal
control is as a rule of a bang-bang form (see e.g. (Lipman & Shinar, 1995;
Rubinsky & Gutman, 2014)). Such a control is piecewise constant with the
values of the upper and lower constraints’ bounds. If a frequency of the
switches between these values is high, then the control chattering occurs.
The control chattering phenomenon is extremely undesirable in various ap-
plications. In the present paper, we replace the hard control constraints used
in (Lipman & Shinar, 1995; Rubinsky & Gutman, 2014) with the soft control
constraints, which are represented by integral quadratic terms of the defender
and attacker controls in the cost functional. Such a replacement, along with
properly chosen penalty coefficients for these terms, incentives the optimal
controls to satisfy given hard constraints, while to be smooth and not to
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reach the boundaries of these hard constraints. The latter allows to avoid
the highly undesirable control chattering. The comparison of a bang-bang
control and a smooth control with respect to the chattering phenomenon can
be found, e.g., in (Turetsky & Glizer, 2005, 2007).
Thus, in the present paper, the defender-attacker-target problem is mod-
eled by the linear-quadratic differential game with the terminal state inequal-
ity constraint. We solve this game, using the penalty function approach.
The penalty function approach to solution of differential games was used
in several works in the literature. Thus in (Heymann, Rajan, & Ardema,
1985), a smooth, monotonically decreasing and unbounded penalty function
was used to relax state constraints (called the event constraints) in a zero-sum
differential game. Then, based on this relaxation, a computational method
was proposed for obtaining suboptimal state-feedback controls of the players.
In (Choi & Tahk, 2000), a time-optimization zero-sum differential game with
a terminal state inequality constraint was considered. The authors propose
to included this constraint into the cost functional, using a discontinuous
penalty function. The effectiveness of such an approach was tested numer-
ically in the planar pursuit-evasion game where speed and heading angle of
each player are subject to a control input. In (Carlson & Leitmann, 2012),
a variational game with equality constraints was considered. This game is
equivalent to an N -person nonzero-sum differential game with simple mo-
tion of the players and equality constraints imposed simultaneously on the
state and the controls. These constraints are penalized yielding a family
(with respect to a penalty parameter) of unconstrained games. Subject to
proper assumptions, it was shown that there exists a sequence of the penalty
parameter tending to infinity, along which open loop Nash equilibria of the
unconstrained games converge to an open loop Nash equilibrium of the orig-
inal game.
In the present paper, the penalty function method is applied to the solu-
tion of the original game in the following way. First, the decomposition of
the game space into two non-intersecting regions is carried out. In the first
region, the original game is equivalent to an unconstrained zero-sum linear-
quadratic differential game. Conditions for the existence of its open-loop
saddle point are derived and this saddle point is obtained. In the second
region, subject to a proper general condition, the equivalence of the origi-
nal game to a zero-sum linear-quadratic differential game with a terminal
state equality constraint is shown. The latter game is solved by the penalty
function method with a quadratic penalty function and a penalty parameter
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tending to infinity. Based on asymptotic analysis of the penalized constraint-
free game and using proper assumptions, the existence of an open-loop saddle
point solution of the equality constraint game in the second region is estab-
lished, and such a solution is obtained. Then conditions in the terms of the
original game’s data, guaranteing that this solution also is a solution of the
original game, are derived. Thus, the game of the present paper and the way
to solve it by application of the penalty function method differ considerably
from the games and their penalty function solutions in the above mentioned
works.
The above made comparison of the present paper with the ones known
in the literature clearly shows the significant novelty of the differential game
considered in the present paper, as well as of the mathematical technique
proposed for the game’s solution and the obtained results.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the pursuit-evasion
differential game with the terminal state inequality constraint, modeled the
defender-attacker-target problem, is rigorously formulated. Its reduction to a
lower dimensional game is carried out. Stages of the reduced game’s solution
are shortly described. In Section 3, the state space of the reduced game is
decomposed into two non-intersecting regions. It is shown that in the first
region the reduced game is equivalent to the unconstraint game. The open-
loop saddle point solution of this game is derived. In Section 4, subject to
the general condition it is shown that the reduced game, considered in the
second region, is equivalent to the game with the terminal state equality
constraint. In Section 5, this equality constraint game is decomposed into
two subgames, each of which is solved by application of the penalty function
method yielding an open-loop saddle point solution. In Section 6, based
on the solutions of the subgames, the open-loop saddle point solution of the
equality constraint game in the second region is obtained. In Section 7, based
on the results of Section 4, it is shown the concrete conditions (in the terms
of the reduced game’s data), guaranteing that this solution also is a solution
of the reduced game with the inequality constraint. Using the results of the
previous sections, the case of the first order controllers for the defender and
the attacker is treated in Section 8. Conclusions are placed in Section 9.
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2 Problem Statement
2.1 Pursuit-evasion model
The engagement between the defender (pursuer) and the attacker (evader) is
considered. The mathematical model of this scenario is based on the follow-
ing assumptions: (i) the engagement takes place in a horizontal plane; (ii)
both players have constant velocities; (iii) each player has a linear controller
dynamics; (iv) the relative trajectory can be linearized with respect to the
nominal collision geometry.
In Fig. 1, the schematic engagement geometry is depicted. The X-axis
is the initial line of sight. The Y -axis is normal to the X-axis. The origin
of the coordinate system is collocated with the target (T) position, which is
also the initial position of the pursuer. The points (xp, yp) and (xe, ye) are
current coordinates of the pursuer (P) and the evader (E), respectively; Vp,
Ve are their velocities; ap, ae are their lateral accelerations; ϕp, ϕe are the
respective angles between the velocity vectors and the X-axis.
X
y
ae
ye
E
•
Ve
xe
Vp
yp
P
•
ap
xp
T
•
Y
ϕp
ϕe
Figure 1: Interception geometry
Based on the small angles assumption (Glizer, Turetsky, Fridman, & Shi-
nar, 2012; Shinar et al., 2013), the trajectories of the pursuer and the evader
can be linearized with respect to the nominal collision geometry, leading to
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a constant closing velocity magnitude Vc = |Vp| + |Ve|. The final intercep-
tion time tf can be easily calculated for any given initial range r0 = xe(0):
tf = r0/Vc. The value xf = |Vp|tf = r0 − |Ve|tf is the distance in the X
direction between the evader and the target at the moment t = tf .
Following the notation, introduced e.g. in (Shima, 2011), we assume that
for t ∈ [0, tf ], the controller dynamics of the pursuer and the evader are
described by the equations
ai = c¯
T
i x¯i + d¯iui, i = p, e, (1)
˙¯xi = A¯ix¯i + b¯iui, x¯i(0) = [0]ni×1, i = p, e, (2)
where x¯i is the state vector consisting of ni internal variables, ui is the scalar
control, i = p, e, [0]k×m denotes a zero (k × m)-matrix. Note that A¯i is an
(ni × ni)-matrix, b¯i, c¯i ∈ Rni , d¯i ∈ R (i = p, e).
For example, if the pursuer and/or the evader has the first-order strictly
proper dynamics, then ni = 1, A¯i = −1/τi, b¯i = 1/τi, c¯i = 1, d¯i = 0,
where τi is the player’s controller time constant; the control ui is the lateral
acceleration command.
Due to (1) – (2), the motion of the pursuer and the evader are described
by the differential equations
X˙i = AiXi +Biui, i = p, e (3)
where the state vector is of the column block form:
Xi = [yi, y˙i, x¯
T
i ]
T , [Xi1 , Xi2, Xi3 , ..., Xini+2]
T , i = p, e, (4)
Ai =
 0 1 [0]1×ni0 0 c¯Ti
[0]ni×1 [0]ni×1 A¯i
 , Bi =
 0d¯i
b¯i
 , i = p, e. (5)
Let us define the column block-form state vector
x = [XTp , X
T
e ]
T = [yp, y˙p, x¯
T
p , ye, y˙e, x¯
T
e ]
T . (6)
Then, due to (3) – (6) and the small angles assumption, the system dynamics
for t ∈ [0, tf ] is described by the linear differential equation
x˙ = Ax+Bup + Cue, (7)
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where
A ,
[
Ap [0](np+2)×(ne+2)
[0](ne+2)×(np+2) Ae
]
, (8)
B ,
[
Bp
[0](ne+2)×1
]
, C ,
[
[0](np+2)×1
Be
]
. (9)
The initial condition is x(0) = [0, |Vp|ϕ0p, [0]1×np , 0, |Ve|ϕ0e, [0]1×ne ]T , where ϕ0e
and ϕ0p are the (small) initial values of the aspect angles ϕe and ϕp.
The objective of the pursuer is to minimize the cost functional
J(up(·), ue(·)) = (ye(tf)− yp(tf ))2 + α
tf∫
0
u2p(t)dt− β
tf∫
0
u2e(t)dt, (10)
where α, β > 0 are penalties for the players’ controls.
Remark 1 The terminal part of the cost functional (10) is the squared miss
distance, while the integral part represents the soft control constraints. In con-
trast with (Lipman & Shinar, 1995; Rubinsky & Gutman, 2014), we do not
impose the geometric (hard) constraints on the controls. However, a proper
choice of the coefficients α and β can provide the validity of feasible geometric
constraints for the players’ optimal controls. Along with this, the structure of
these controls differs considerably from the structure of the optimal controls
in (Lipman & Shinar, 1995; Rubinsky & Gutman, 2014). Namely, the op-
timal controls of (Lipman & Shinar, 1995; Rubinsky & Gutman, 2014) are
piecewise constant with the values of the upper and lower constraints’ bounds,
while the optimal controls obtained in the present paper are smooth and do
not reach the boundaries of the feasible geometric constraints.
The evader has a twofold objective. Its first objective is to maximize (10).
The second objective is to be capable to reach the target at t = tf+ tc, where
tc is such that xe(tf + tc) = 0: tc = xf/|Ve| = νtf , ν , |Vp|/|Ve|. In order
to formulate the evader’s second objective, let us calculate the Y -separation
between the evader and the target for t = tf + tc. Due to (3) for i = e,
ye(tf + tc) = Xe1(tf + tc) =
De
Φe(tf + tc, tf)Xe(tf ) + tf+tc∫
tf
Φe(tf + tc, t)Beue(t)dt
 , (11)
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where
De =
[
1, [0]1×(ne+1)
]
, (12)
Φe(tf + tc, t) =
{
φekj(tf + tc, t)
} ∣∣∣ne+2
k,j=1
, (13)
is the transition matrix of the homogeneous system, corresponding to (3) for
i = e. This matrix satisfies
d
dt
Φe(tf + tc, t) = −Φe(tf + tc, t)Ae, Φe(tf + tc, tf + tc) = Ine+2. (14)
For t ∈ [tf , tf + tc], we make a practically justified assumption that the
evader’s control is bounded:
|ue(t)| ≤ amaxe , amaxe > 0, (15)
where −amaxe and amaxe are the lower and the upper bounds of the evader’s
control, respectively. Since ye(tf + tc) = 0, by virtue of (11) and (15),
|DeΦe(tf + tc, tf)Xe(tf )| ≤ µeamaxe , µe ,
tf+tc∫
tf
|DeΦe(tf + tc, t)Be| dt. (16)
The pursuit-evasion differential game for the system (7) with the cost
functional (10) and the evader’s terminal constraint (16) is called the Original
Game (OG).
Remark 2 A linear-quadratic differential game without hard control con-
strains is an acceptable model for various interception problems (see, e.g.,
(Bryson & Ho, 1975; Ben-Asher & Yaesh, 1998)). In this paper, the inter-
ception problem is mainly considered from the pursuer’s viewpoint. There-
fore, the absence of the evader’s geometric control constraint for t ∈ [0, tf ]
in the OG represents the worst case from the pursuer’s point of view, i.e., a
hard geometric constraint is replaced by a soft constraint (the integral term of
the cost functional (10)). From the other hand, the absence of the geometric
constraint for the pursuer allows designing a more implementable pursuer’s
control, namely, a smooth open-loop control. Moreover, by a proper choice
of the penalty coefficients α and β, we can provide a prescribed geometric
constraint of the optimal up(t). It should be also noted that in a real-life sit-
uation, the pursuer does not know the evader’s behavior, and, consequently,
cannot guarantee the capture (i.e., the condition ye(tf ) = yp(tf )). Therefore,
the pursuer is forced to play a game as the most effective tool for designing
the control.
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2.2 Game reduction
Let us formulate the system, describing the relative motion between the
evader and the pursuer in the direction normal to the initial line-of-sight
(the Y -axis direction). Its state vector
Xep = [ye − yp, y˙e − y˙p, xTp , xTe ]T ,
[Xep1 , Xep2 , Xep3 , ..., Xepnp+2, Xepnp+3, ..., Xepnp+ne+2]
T (17)
satisfies the differential equation
X˙ep = AepXep +Bepup + Cepue, t ∈ [0, tf ], (18)
where Aep =

0 1 [0]1×np [0]1×ne
0 0 −cTp cTe
[0]np×1 [0]np×1 Ap [0]np×ne
[0]ne×1 [0]ne×1 [0]ne×np Ae
 ,
Bep =

0
−d¯p
b¯p
[0]ne×1
 , Cep =

0
d¯e
[0]np×1
b¯e
 . (19)
Let us introduce two new scalar state variables. The first is
z(t) , DepΦep(tf , t)Xep(t), t ∈ [0, tf ], (20)
where
Dep =
[
1, [0]1×(np+ne+1)
]
, (21)
Φep(tf , t) is the transition matrix of the homogeneous system, corresponding
to (18). The variable z(t) is the zero-effort miss distance (ZEM) in the
engagement of the evader and the pursuer: if at some moment t = t1 both
players stop to control (up = ue = 0 for t ∈ [t1, tf ]), then the value ye(tf )−
yp(tf ) (miss distance) is equal to z(t1). Due to (17) and (20),
z(tf ) = ye(tf )− yp(tf). (22)
The second scalar state variable is
w(t) , DeΦe(tf + tc, t)Xe(t), (23)
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where De and Φe are given by (12) – (14). The variable w(t) is the ZEM in
the engagement between the evader and the static target.
By using (3), (14), (18) and the properties of the transition matrix, one
obtains the differential equations for the new state variables z and w in the
interval [0, tf ]:
z˙ = hp(t)up + he(t)ue, z(0) = z0, (24)
w˙ = ge(t)ue, w(0) = w0, (25)
where ge(t) = DeΦe(tf+tc, t)Be, z0 = tf (|Ve|ϕ0e−|Vp|ϕ0p), w0 = (tf+tc)|Ve|ϕ0e,
hp(t) = DepΦep(tf , t)Bep, he(t) = DepΦep(tf , t)Cep. (26)
Due to (22), the cost functional (10) can be rewritten as
J(up(·), ue(·)) = z2(tf ) + α
tf∫
0
u2p(t)dt− β
tf∫
0
u2e(t)dt. (27)
Due to (23), the constraint (16) becomes
|w(tf)| ≤ µeamaxe . (28)
In what follows, we deal with the pursuit-evasion differential game for the
system (24) – (25) with the cost functional (27) and the terminal evader’s
constrain (28). We call this game the Reduced Game (RG), because its
state vector (z, w)T is only two-dimensional, whereas the state vector x of
the original game has the dimension np + ne + 4. In this game, the set of
admissible pursuer’s controls is
Up = {up(·) ∈ L2[0, tf ]}, (29)
where L2[0, tf ] is the space of square integrable functions defined on [0, tf ],
whereas the set of admissible evader’s controls is
Ue =
ue(·) ∈ L2[0, tf ] :
∣∣∣∣∣∣w0 +
tf∫
0
ge(t)ue(t)dt
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ µeamaxe
 . (30)
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2.3 Solution stages
The RG solution is carried out in several stages. First, we consider the
corresponding game without the constraint (28) (the Unconstrained Reduced
Game, URG). We obtain the condition, guaranteeing that the URG open-
loop saddle point solution satisfies the constraint (28). In this case, the
solution of the URG is also the solution of the RG. Then, we show that if
the above mentioned condition is not valid, the RG open-loop saddle point
solution yields the equality terminal constraint
|w(tf)| = µeamaxe . (31)
The game with the constraint (31) is called the Equality constraint Re-
duced Game (ERG). For this game we establish a general sufficient condition,
subject to which its open-loop saddle point solution becomes a solution in
the RG. Then, the open-loop saddle point solutions of two ERG subgames:
ERG+ and ERG− for the constraints w(tf) = µeamaxe and w(tf) = −µeamaxe ,
respectively, are derived. Based on the solutions of the ERG+ and the ERG−,
conditions for the existence of the ERG open-loop saddle point solution are
established, and the saddle point itself is derived. Finally, we show that the
saddle point of the ERG becomes the saddle point of the RG without any
additional condition.
3 Unconstrained Game Solution
In the URG, the differential equation (25) can be dropped from the system
dynamics. Once having the optimal control u0e(t), the value of w(tf) is ob-
tained straightforwardly by solution of (25) for ue = u
0
e(t). Knowing w(tf),
we can derive the conditions guaranteeing that (28) is satisfied.
The admissible controls in this game for both players are square-integrable
functions in the interval [0, tf ]. The solution of a linear-quadratic differential
game is well known (see, e.g., (Bryson & Ho, 1975; Bernhard, 2015), and
references therein).
Denote
s , 1 + 1
α
tf∫
0
h2p(t)dt−
1
β
tf∫
0
h2e(t)dt. (32)
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Proposition 1 If
β >
tf∫
0
h2e(t)dt, (33)
then s 6= 0 and the pair
u0p(t) = −
hp(t)z0
αs
, u0e(t) =
he(t)z0
βs
(34)
constitutes the URG saddle point.
Proof. The expressions (34) directly follow from (Bernhard, 2015, Eq.
(3)). Due to (Bernhard, 2015, Theorem 1), the pair (34) is the URG saddle
point if the solution of the differential Riccati equation
P˙ = − 1
β
h2e(t)P
2, P (tf) = 1, (35)
has no conjugate points in the interval [0, tf ]. The solution of (35) is P (t) =1− 1
β
tf∫
t
h2e(ξ)dξ
−1. Thus, this solution has no conjugate points if the
condition (33) holds. ✷
Remark 3 Subject to the condition (33), s > 0, and, consequently, the open-
loop saddle-point controls (34) are feasible for t ∈ [0, tf ].
Due to (25) and (34), w(tf) = w0 +
tf∫
0
ge(t)u
0
e(t) = w0 + az0, where
a , 1
βs
tf∫
0
he(t)ge(t)dt. (36)
Thus, the condition (28) can be rewritten as |w0+az0| ≤ µeamaxe . For fixed ν,
amaxe , α and β, the strict version of this defines the set Ω in the plane (z0, w0).
It is an infinite strip between the straight lines w0 = −az0 ± µeamaxe :
Ω =
{
(z0, w0) : |w0 + az0| < µeamaxe
}
. (37)
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4 Reduced Game for (z0, w0) /∈ Ω
Lemma 1 Let (u∗p(·), u∗e(·)) be a saddle point in the RG with (z0, w0) /∈ Ω.
Then, the solution w(t) generated by u∗e(·), satisfies the equality (31).
Proof.
Since (u∗p(·), u∗e(·) is the RG saddle point, then the saddle point inequality
is valid:
J(u∗p(·), ue(·)) ≤ J(u∗p(·), u∗e(·)) ≤ J(up(·), u∗e(·)), ∀ up(·) ∈ Up, ue(·) ∈ Ue,
(38)
where the sets of the admissible pursuer’s and evader’s controls are given by
(29) and (30), respectively.
The left-hand inequality in (38) means that u∗e(t) is the solution of the
optimal control problem with the following data: (i) the dynamics (24) –
(25) with up(t) = u
∗
p(t), (ii) the cost functional (27) with up(t) = u
∗
p(t) to
be maximized by ue(t), and (iii) the terminal constraint (28). Then, due
to (Vasilyev, 1988), there exist the functions λz(t), λw(t) and the numbers
λf1 ≥ 0, λf2 ≥ 0, such that
λ˙z = 0, λz(tf) = 2z(tf ), (39)
λ˙w = 0, λw(tf ) = λ
f
1 − λf2 , (40)
λf1(w(tf)− µeamaxe ) = 0, λf2(w(tf) + µeamaxe ) = 0, (41)
and
u∗e(t) =
1
2β
[he(t)λz(t) + ge(t)λw(t)] , (42)
where z(t) and w(t) are the solutions of (24) – (25), generated by the pair
(u∗p(·), u∗e(·)). Note that (39) yields
λz(t) ≡ 2z(tf ). (43)
Now, let us assume that the statement of the lemma is wrong, i.e the
solution w(t) generated by u∗e(·), satisfies
w(tf) < µea
max
e , w(tf) > −µeamaxe . (44)
In this case, the complementary slackness condition (41) leads to λf1 = λ
f
2 =
0, which, due to (40), yields
λw(t) ≡ 0. (45)
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Due to (43) and (45),
u∗e(t) =
he(t)z(tf )
β
. (46)
Now, let us specify the strategy u∗p(t). The right-hand side inequality in (38)
means that u∗p(t) is the solution of the optimal control problem with the
following data: (i) the dynamics (24) with ue(t) = u
∗
e(t), and (ii) the cost
functional (27) with ue(t) = u
∗
e(t) to be minimized by up(t). The solution of
this standard linear-quadratic control problem without terminal constrain is
(Vasilyev, 1988)
u∗p(t) = −
hp(t)z(tf )
α
. (47)
Note that z(tf ) in (46) and (47) is the same: it is the terminal value
of the solution of (24), generated by the pair (u∗p(·), u∗e(·)). By substituting
(46) and (47) into (24) and solving the resulting equation: z(tf ) = z0 −
z(tf )
α
tf∫
0
h2p(t)dt+
z(tf )
β
tf∫
0
h2e(t)dt, yielding
z(tf ) =
z0
s
, (48)
where the function s is given by (32). By substituting (48) into (46) and
(47), one can see that, subject to the assumption (44), the RG saddle point
(u∗p(·), u∗e(·)) coincides with the URG saddle point (34). Therefore, by defi-
nition (37) of the set Ω, this means that (z0, w0) ∈ Ω which contradicts with
the assumption of the lemma. Thus the assumption (44) is wrong. This
proves the lemma. ✷
Due to Lemma 1, for the case (z0, w0) /∈ Ω, an open-loop saddle point
solution of the RG is an open-loop saddle point solution of the ERG. The
latter consists of the dynamics equations (24) – (25), the cost functional (27)
and the terminal evader’s equality constraint (31). In this game, the set of
admissible pursuer’s controls is Up = {up(·) ∈ L2[0, tf ]}, whereas the set of
admissible evader’s controls is
U¯e =
ue(·) ∈ L2[0, tf ] :
∣∣∣∣∣∣w0 +
tf∫
0
ge(t)ue(t)dt
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = µeamaxe
 . (49)
Now, let us derive a condition, subject to which an open-loop saddle point
solution (u¯∗p(·), u¯∗e(·)) of the ERG is an open-loop saddle point solution of the
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RG. For this purpose, we consider the optimal control problem, consisting of
the equations of dynamics
z˙ = hp(t)u¯
∗
p(t) + he(t)u¯e, z(0) = z0, (50)
w˙ = ge(t)u¯e, w(0) = w0, (51)
the state constraint (28) and the performance index
J¯e(u¯
∗
p(·), u¯e(·)) , z2(tf)− β
tf∫
0
u¯2e(t)dt→ max
u¯e(·)∈Ue
. (52)
Lemma 2 Let (u¯∗p(·), u¯∗e(·)) be a saddle point in the ERG with (z0, w0) /∈ Ω.
Then, the pair (u¯∗p(·), u¯∗e(·)) also is a saddle point in the RG with the same
initial position (z0, w0) if and only if u¯e(t) = u¯
∗
e(t) is an optimal control in
the problem (50) – (52),(28).
Proof. Necessity. Let (u¯∗p(·), u¯∗e(·)) be a saddle point in the RG. Then,
the inequality
J(u¯∗p(·), ue(·)) ≤ J(u¯∗p(·), u¯∗e(·)) ≤ J(up(·), u¯∗e(·)), ∀ up(·) ∈ Up, ue(·) ∈ Ue.
(53)
is satisfied. The left-hand side of this inequality directly implies that u¯e(t) =
u¯∗e(t) is an optimal control in the problem (50) – (52), (28). Thus, the
necessity is proven.
Sufficiency. Since (u¯∗p(·), u¯∗e(·)) is a saddle point in the ERG, then it satisfies
the inequality
J(u¯∗p(·), ue(·)) ≤ J(u¯∗p(·), u¯∗e(·)) ≤ J(up(·), u¯∗e(·)), ∀ up(·) ∈ Up, ue(·) ∈ U¯e.
(54)
To prove the sufficiency, we should show the fulfilment of the inequality
(53). The fulfilment of the right-hand inequality in (53) directly follows
from the right-hand side inequality in (54). The fulfilment of the left-hand
inequality in (53) immediately follows from the assumption that u¯∗e(t) is an
optimal control in the problem (50) – (52), (28). Thus, the sufficiency is
proven, which completes the proof of the lemma. ✷
Remark 4 Lemmas 1 and 2 imply the following. If the assumption of
Lemma 2 with respect to the optimal control problem (50) – (52), (28) is sat-
isfied, then the RG and the ERG with the same initial position (z0, w0) /∈ Ω
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are equivalent to each other in the sense of the open-loop saddle point so-
lutions. In the subsequent sections, we obtain an open-loop saddle point in
the ERG for (z0, w0) /∈ Ω. Then, we show that this saddle point satisfies the
assumption of Lemma 2 with respect to the optimal control problem (50) –
(52), (28), i.e., the obtained ERG saddle point becomes a saddle point in the
RG.
5 Saddle Point Solutions of Equality Constraint
Subgames for (z0, w0) /∈ Ω
For the solution of these subgames ERG+ and ERG−, we propose to use the
penalty functions method.
5.1 Unconstrained game with penalized cost functional
Let us start with the ERG+. For this game, the set of admissible evader’s
controls is U+e =
ue(·) ∈ L2[0, tf ] : w0 +
tf∫
0
ge(t)ue(t)dt = µea
max
e
 .
Consider an auxiliary linear-quadratic differential game for the system
(24) – (25) with the cost functional
J+ε = J −
1
ε
(w(tf)− µeamaxe )2, (55)
where ε > 0 is a parameter. This game is called the Unconstrained Penalized
Game corresponding to the ERG+ (UPG+ε ). Note that the UPG
+
ε , having
no state constraints, is a standard linear-quadratic differential game. The
Hamiltonian in this game is
H = H(t, λz, λw, up, ue) =
λz(hp(t)up + he(t)ue) + λwge(t)ue + αu
2
p − βu2e, (56)
where λz and λw are the co-state variables, satisfying the differential equa-
tions
λ˙z = −∂H
∂z
= 0, λz(tf) = 2z(tf ), (57)
λ˙w = −∂H
∂w
= 0, λw(tf ) = −2
ε
(w(tf)− µeamaxe ). (58)
19
The solutions of (57) – (58) are
λεz ≡ 2z+fε, λεw ≡ −2v+fε, (59)
where
z+fε , z(tf ), v+fε ,
w(tf)− µeamaxe
ε
. (60)
Due to (Bryson & Ho, 1975) and by using (59), the UPG+ε candidate open-
loop saddle point is
u+pε(t) = argmin
up
H(t, λz, λw, up, ue) = − 1
α
hp(t)z
+
fε, (61)
u+eε(t) = argmax
ue
H(t, λz, λw, up, ue) =
1
β
[
he(t)z
+
fε − ge(t)v+fε
]
. (62)
Substituting (61) – (62) into the system (24) – (25), solving the resulting
system and taking into account the notation (60) yield
z+fε = z0 −
 1
α
tf∫
0
h2p(t)dt−
1
β
tf∫
0
h2e(t)dt
 z+fε − 1β
 tf∫
0
he(t)ge(t)dt
 v+fε,
εv+fε + µea
max
e = w0 +
1
β
 tf∫
0
he(t)ge(t)dt
 z+fε − 1β
 tf∫
0
g2e(t)dt
 v+fε.
These equations lead to the linear system with respect to ω+ε , (z+fε, v+fε)T :
(G+Dε)ω
+
ε = b
+, (63)
where
G ,
 G1 G2
−G2 G3
 , (64)
G1 = s, G2 =
1
β
tf∫
0
he(t)ge(t)dt, G3 =
1
β
tf∫
0
g2e(t)dt, (65)
Dε ,
 0 0
0 ε
 , b+ = [ z0
w0 − µeamaxe
]
, (66)
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s is given by (32). It can be seen directly that, subject to the condition (33),
the matrix G +Dε is non-singular for all ε ≥ 0. Thus, the system (63) has
the unique solution
ω+ε = (G+Dε)
−1b+. (67)
Thus, the candidate optimal players’ controls in the UPG+ε are completely
derived.
Proposition 2 If the condition (33) holds, then for any ε > 0, the pair (61)
– (62) constitutes the UPG+ε saddle point, i.e.,
J+ε (u
+
pε(·), ue(·)) ≤ J+ε (u+pε(·), u+eε(·)) ≤ J+ε (up(·), u+eε(·)), (68)
for all up(·), ue(·) ∈ L2[0, tf ] and for ε > 0.
Proof. For the UPG+ε , the Riccati equation (Bernhard, 2015, Eq. (2))
becomes
P˙ = − 1
β
P
[
h2e(t) he(t)ge(t)
he(t)ge(t) g
2
e(t)
]
P, P (tf) =
[
1 0
0 −1/ε
]
. (69)
It is verified directly that the solution of (69) is
P (t) =

1− 1
β
tf∫
t
h2e(ξ)dξ −
1
β
tf∫
t
he(ξ)ge(ξ)dξ
1
βε
tf∫
t
he(ξ)ge(ξ)dξ 1 +
1
βε
tf∫
t
g2e(ξ)dξ

−1
[
1 0
0 −1/ε
]
.
(70)
The condition (33) guarantees the existence of the inverse matrix in (70) for
all t ∈ [0, tf ] and all ε ≥ 0. Thus, by virtue of (Bernhard, 2015), the pair
(61) – (62) indeed constitutes the UPG+ε saddle point. ✷
By substituting the saddle point (61) – (62) into the cost functional (55),
the value of the UPG+ε is
(J+ε )
∗ , J+ε (u+pε(·), u+eε(·)) = (ω+ε )T G˜εω+ε , (71)
where G˜ε , diag(1,−1)(G+Dε).
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Remark 5 For the ERG−, the set of admissible evader’s controls is
U−e =
ue(·) ∈ L2[0, tf ] : w0 +
tf∫
0
ge(t)ue(t)dt = −µeamaxe
 .
For the UPG−ε , corresponding to the ERG
−, the cost functional is
J−ε = J −
1
ε
(w(tf) + µea
max
e )
2.
The UPG−ε saddle point (u
−
pε(·), u−eε(·)) has the same form as (61) – (62)
where the vector ω+ε = (z
+
fε, v
+
fε)
T is replaced by ω−ε = (z
−
fε, v
−
fε)
T satisfying
the system
(G+Dε)ω
−
ε = b
−, b− =
[
z0
w0 + µea
max
e .
]
.
The value of the UPG−ε is (J
−
ε )
∗ = (ω−ε )
T G˜εω
−
ε .
5.2 Limit of the UPG+ε /UPG
−
ε solutions for ε→ 0
Lemma 3 If the condition (33) holds, then for the solution of the UPG+ε ,
u+p (t) , lim
ε→0
u+pε(t) = −
1
α
hp(t)z
+
f , t ∈ [0, tf ], (72)
u+e (t) , lim
ε→0
u+eε(t) =
1
β
[
he(t)z
+
f − ge(t)v+f
]
, t ∈ [0, tf ], (73)
(J+)∗ , lim
ε→0
(J+ε )
∗ = (ω+f )
T G˜ω+f , (74)
where
ω+f = (z
+
f , v
+
f )
T = G−1b+, (75)
G˜ = diag(1,−1)G. (76)
Proof. By limiting (67) for ε→ 0,
ω+f , limε→0ω
+
ε = G
−1b+. (77)
Now, calculating the limits of the UPG+ε saddle point (61) – (62) and the
game value (71) for ε→ 0, and using (77) directly yield (72) – (74).
✷
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Corollary 1 The value (J+)∗ can be expressed as
(J+)∗ = χT0 G¯χ0 + 2χ
T
0 G¯γ
+ + (γ+)T G¯γ+, (78)
where
G¯ , (G−1)Tdiag(1,−1), (79)
χ0 , (z0, w0)T , (80)
γ+ , (0,−µeamaxe )T , (81)
Proof. The expression (78) is proved by direct substitution of ω+f = G
−1b+
into (74) and by the representation
b+ = χ0 + γ
+. (82)
✷
Remark 6 Similarly to Lemma 3, for the solution of the UPG−ε ,
u−p (t) , lim
ε→0
u−pε(t) = −
1
α
hp(t)z
−
f , t ∈ [0, tf ], (83)
u−e (t) , lim
ε→0
u−eε(t) =
1
β
[
he(t)z
−
f − ge(t)v−f
]
, t ∈ [0, tf ], (84)
(J−)∗ , lim
ε→0
(J−ε )
∗ = (ω−f )
T G˜ω−f = χ
T
0 G¯χ0 + 2χ
T
0 G¯γ
− + (γ−)T G¯γ−, (85)
where
ω−f = (z
−
f , v
−
f )
T = G−1b−, γ− , (0, µeamaxe )T . (86)
5.3 ERG+/ERG− saddle points
Theorem 1 Let the condition (33) hold. Then,
u+e (·) ∈ U+e , (87)
i.e., for ue = u
+
e , the equality constraint w(tf) = µea
max
e is satisfied in the
ERG+. Moreover, the pair (u+p (·), u+e (·)) given by (72) – (73) constitutes the
saddle point of the ERG+, whereas the value (J+)∗ given by (74) is the value
of the ERG+:
J(u+p (·), ue(·)) ≤ J(u+p (·), u+e (·)) ≤ J(up(·), u+e (·)), ∀ up(·) ∈ Up, ue(·) ∈ U+e ,
(88)
and
J(u+p (·), u+e (·)) = (J+)∗. (89)
23
Proof. By integrating the differential equation (25) for ue = u
+
e ,
w(tf) = w0 +G2z
+
f −G3v+f . (90)
From the form of the matrix G, defined by (64) – (65), vector b+, given in
(66), and from (75),
µea
max
e = w0 +G2z
+
f −G3v+f . (91)
Comparison of (90) and (91) leads to w(tf) = µea
max
e , which implies the
inclusion (87). Similarly, by integrating the differential equation (24) for
up = u
+
p , ue = u
+
e ,
z(tf ) = z
+
f . (92)
Substituting u+p (·) and u+e (·) into the original cost functional J (see (27))
and using (92) yield after a routine algebra the equality (89).
Now, let us proceed to the proof of the ERG+ saddle point inequality
(88). We prove it by limiting for ε→ 0 in the UPG+ε saddle inequality (68).
Due to (24), (55), (61), for up(·) = u+pε(·) and any ue(·) ∈ U+e ⊂ Ue,
J+ε (u
+
pε(·), ue(·)) = z˜2(tf) +
1
α
tf∫
0
h2p(t)dt(z
ε
f)
2 − β
tf∫
0
u2e(t)dt, (93)
where z˜(t) is the solution of the differential equation (24) generated by u+pε(·)
and ue(·). Thus,
z˜(tf) = z0 − 1
α
tf∫
0
h2p(t)dt(z
ε
f ) +
tf∫
0
he(t)ue(t)dt. (94)
Due to (75) and (77),
lim
ε→0
zεf = z
+
f , limε→0
vεf = v
+
f . (95)
Using (27), (72) and (93) – (95) yields
lim
ε→0
J+ε (u
+
pε(·), ue(·)) = J(u+p (·), ue(·)), ue(·) ∈ U+e (96)
Similarly it is shown that
lim
ε→0
J+ε (up(·), u+eε(·)) = J(up(·), u+e (·)), up(·) ∈ Up. (97)
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Furthermore, by (71), (74) and (89),
lim
ε→0
J+ε (u
+
pε(·), u+eε(·)) = J(u+p (·), u+e (·)). (98)
Now, based on (96) – (98), the limiting ε→ 0 in (68) for up(·) ∈ Up, ue(·) ∈
U+e leads to the ERG
+ saddle-point inequality (88). This completes the proof
of the theorem. ✷
Remark 7 Similarly to Theorem 1, subject to the condition (33), u−e (·) ∈
U−e , i.e., for ue = u
−
e , the equality constraint w(tf) = −µeamaxe is satisfied in
the ERG−. Moreover, the pair (u−p (·), u−e (·)) given by (83) – (84) constitutes
the saddle point of the ERG−, whereas the value (J−)∗ given by (85) is the
value of the ERG−:
J(u−p (·), ue(·)) ≤ J(u−p (·), u−e (·)) ≤ J(up(·), u−e (·)), ∀ up(·) ∈ Up, ue(·) ∈ U−e ,
and J(u−p (·), u−e (·)) = (J−)∗. Moreover, in the ERG−,
w(tf) = −µamaxe , (99)
z(tf ) = z
−
f . (100)
6 Saddle Point Solution of the Equality Con-
straint Game for (z0, w0) /∈ Ω
The set (49) of admissible evader’s controls in the ERG can be represented
as
U¯e = U
+
e ∪ U−e . (101)
In this section, we establish the conditions guaranteeing that the ERG
saddle point coincides with the saddle point either of the ERG+, or of the
ERG−. This means that one of the saddle point inequalities is valid:
J(u+p (·), ue(·)) ≤ J(u+p (·), u+e (·)) ≤ J(up(·), u+e (·)), ∀ up(·) ∈ Up, ue(·) ∈ U¯e,
(102)
or
J(u−p (·), ue(·)) ≤ J(u−p (·), u−e (·)) ≤ J(up(·), u−e (·)), ∀ up(·) ∈ Up, ue(·) ∈ U¯e,
(103)
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The derivation of these conditions is based on two auxiliary optimal con-
trol problems with terminal state equality constraints. The first problem is
formulated for the system
z˙ = hp(t)u
+
p (t) + he(t)ue, z(0) = z0, (104)
w˙ = ge(t)ue, w(0) = w0, w(tf) = −µeamaxe , (105)
and the cost functional
Je1(u
+
p (·), ue(·)) , z2(tf )− β
tf∫
0
u2e(t)dt→ max
ue(·)∈U−e
. (106)
The second problem is formulated for the system and the cost functional
z˙ = hp(t)u
−
p (t) + he(t)ue, z(0) = z0, (107)
w˙ = ge(t)ue, w(0) = w0, w(tf) = µea
max
e , (108)
Je2(u
−
p (·), ue(·)) , z2(tf)− β
tf∫
0
u2e(t)dt→ max
ue(·)∈U+e
. (109)
6.1 Solution of the auxiliary optimal control problems
with terminal state equality constraints
Due to the results of (Ioffe & Tikhomirov, 1979), both auxiliary optimal
control problems have solutions.
6.1.1 Solution of the first problem
Let us start with the problem (104) – (106). By the Pontryagin Maximum
Principle (Vasilyev, 1988), the Hamiltonian of this problem is
H1 = λz(hp(t)u
+
p (t) + he(t)ue) + λwge(t)ue − βu2e,
where the co-states λz and λw satisfy
λ˙z = −∂H
∂z
= 0, λz(tf ) = 2z(tf ); λ˙w = −∂H
∂w
= 0.
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Thus, λz ≡ 2z(tf ), λw ≡ const .
The optimal control is
u∗e1(t) = arg max
ue∈U−e
H =
he(t)λz + ge(t)λw
2β
=
1
β
(he(t)z(tf )− ge(t)λ˜w), (110)
where λ˜w , −λw/2.
Substituting (110) into the equations (104) – (105), following by their
integration, yield the linear algebraic system w.r.t. ω1 , (z(tf ), λ˜w)T :
Fω1 = µ1, (111)
where
F ,

1− 1
β
tf∫
0
h2e(t)dt G2
−G2 G3
 , µ1 , χ0+ξ1, ξ1 , γ−+

tf∫
0
hp(t)u
+
p (t)dt
0
 .
(112)
Remember that the values G2 and G3 are defined in (65), the vectors χ0 and
γ− are given by (80) and in (86), respectively.
Subject to the condition (33), the matrix F is non-singular, yielding the
unique solution of the system (111)
ω1 = F
−1µ1. (113)
Substituting (110) into the functional (106) and taking into account (113)
yield, after a routine algebra, the optimal value of the cost functional in the
first auxiliary optimal control problem:
J∗e1 = Je1(u
+
p (·), u∗e1(·)) = χT0 F¯ χ0 + 2χT0 F¯ ξ1 + ξT1 F¯ ξ1, (114)
where
F¯ = (F−1)Tdiag(1,−1). (115)
Due to (27) and (114),
J(u+p (·), u∗e1(·)) = Je1(u+p (·), u∗e1(·)) + α
tf∫
0
(u+p (t))
2dt
= χT0 F¯ χ0 + 2χ
T
0 F¯ ξ1 + ξ
T
1 F¯ ξ1 + α
tf∫
0
(u+p (t))
2dt. (116)
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Let us show that the value (116) is a quadratic form w.r.t. the vector χ0.
Indeed, due to (72), (75) and (82),
u+p (t) = −
1
α
hp(t)(1, 0)G
−1(χ0 + γ+). (117)
By using (117), we can represent the vector ξ1 given in (112) as
ξ1 = γ
− − diag(νp, 0)G−1(χ0 + γ+), (118)
where
νp ,
1
α
tf∫
0
h2p(t)dt. (119)
Moreover, the last term of the right-hand side in (116) can be expressed as
α
tf∫
0
(u+p (t))
2dt = (χ0 + γ
+)T (G−1)Tdiag(νp, 0)G−1(χ0 + γ+). (120)
Substitution of the equations (118) and (120) into (116) converts the
latter to a quadratic form with respect to χ0:
J(u+p (·), u∗e1(·)) = χT0 G¯χ0 + 2χT0 G¯γ− + ρ, (121)
where the matrix G¯, given by (79), defines the quadratic term in the expres-
sion (78) for the ERG+ value (J+)∗,
ρ =
(µea
max
e )
2 [3νpG
2
2 − (G1 − νp) det(G)]
det(G) det(F )
.
6.1.2 Solution of the second problem
Similarly to the solution of the problem (104) – (106) we obtain the solution
of the problem (107) – (109). Namely, the optimal control in this problem
has the form u∗e2(t) =
1
β
(he(t),−ge(t))F−1µ2, where the matrix F is given in
(112), and µ2 , χ0 + ξ2, ξ2 , γ+ +

tf∫
0
hp(t)u
−
p (t)dt
0
 .
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The optimal value of the cost functional in the problem (107) – (109) is
J∗e2 = Je2(u
−
p (·), u∗e2(·)) = χT0 F¯χ0 + 2χT0 F¯ ξ2 + ξT2 F¯ ξ2, where the matrix F¯ is
given by (115).
The value of the cost functional (27), calculated for up(t) = u
−
p (t) and
ue(t) = u
∗
e2(t), has the form
J(u−p (·), u∗e2(·)) = Je2(u−p (·), u∗e2(·)) + α
tf∫
0
(u−p (t))
2dt
= χT0 F¯ χ0 + 2χ
T
0 F¯ ξ2 + ξ
T
2 F¯ ξ2 + α
tf∫
0
(u−p (t))
2dt. (122)
Moreover, similarly to (117) – (120), we obtain u−p (t) = − 1αhp(t)(1, 0)G−1(χ0+
γ−),
ξ2 = γ
+ − diag(νp, 0)G−1(χ0 + γ−), (123)
α
tf∫
0
(u−p (t))
2dt = (χ0 + γ
−)T (G−1)Tdiag(νp, 0)G−1(χ0 + γ−). (124)
Substitution of the equations (123) and (124) into (122) converts the
latter to a quadratic form with respect to χ0:
J(u−p (·), u∗e2(·)) = χT0 G¯χ0 + 2χT0 G¯γ+ + ρ. (125)
6.2 Conditions for fulfilment of the saddle point in-
equalities (102) and (103)
Theorem 2 Let the condition (33) hold. Let (z0, w0) /∈ Ω. Then, the pair
(u+p (·), u+e (·)) constitutes a saddle point in the ERG if and only if
J(u+p (·), u∗e1(·)) ≤ J(u+p (·), u+e (·)). (126)
Proof. Necessity. Let the pair (u+p (·), u+e (·)) be a saddle point in the ERG.
Then, the inequality (102) is valid. Due to the left-hand inequality in (102)
and the equations (27), (106), u+e (t) is an optimal control in the problem
consisting of the equations of dynamics (104) and
w˙ = ge(t)ue, w(0) = w0, |w(tf)| = µeamaxe , (127)
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and the performance index
Je1(u
+
p (·), ue(·))→ max
ue(·)∈U¯e
. (128)
Remember, that u∗e1(t) is an optimal control in the problem (104) – (106).
Comparing this optimal control problem and the problem (104), (127), (128),
and taking into account the inclusion U−e ⊂ U¯e (see (101)), we obtain the
inequality Je1(u
+
p (·), u∗e1(·)) ≤ Je1(u+p (·), u+e (·)). The latter, along with the
equations (27), (106), directly yields the inequality (126). This completes
the proof of the necessity.
Sufficiency. Since (u+p (·), u+e (·)) is a saddle point in the ERG+, then the
inequality (102) is fulfilled for all ue(·) ∈ U+e . Let us show that this inequality
is fulfilled for all ue(·) ∈ U−e . Note, that the right-hand side inequality in
(102) is independent on ue(·), and it is fulfilled for all up(·) ∈ Up. Thus, to
prove the fulfilment of (102) for all ue(·) ∈ U−e , it is sufficient to show the
validity of its left-hand inequality for these ue(·).
Since u∗e1(·) is the optimal control in the first auxiliary problem (104) –
(106), then
Je1(u
+
p (·), ue(·)) ≤ Je1(u+p (·), u∗e1(·)) ∀ ue(·) ∈ U−e . (129)
From (27) and (106), we directly obtain
J(u+p (·), ue(·)) = Je1(u+p (·), ue(·)) + α
∫ tf
0
(u+p (t))
2dt ∀ue(·) ∈ U−e . (130)
The equations (116), (130) and the inequalities (126), (129) immediately
yield the validity of the left-hand inequality in (102) for all ue(·) ∈ U−e . This
completes the proof of the sufficiency. Thus, the theorem is proven. ✷
Theorem 3 Let the condition (33) hold. Let (z0, w0) /∈ Ω. Then, the pair
(u−p (·), u−e (·)) constitutes a saddle point in the ERG if and only if
J(u−p (·), u∗e2(·)) ≤ J(u−p (·), u−e (·)). (131)
Proof. Using the solution of the second auxiliary problem (107) – (109) (see
Section 6.1.2), the theorem is proven similarly to Theorem 2. ✷
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Remark 8 Due to (78) and (121), the condition (126) reads
2χT0 G¯(γ
− − γ+) + ρ− (γ+)T G¯γ+ ≤ 0. (132)
By routine algebra, this inequality becomes
w0 + az0 ≥ dµeamaxe , (133)
where the coefficient a is the same as in the definition (37) of the set Ω,
d =
νpG
2
2
G1 det(F )
> 0. (134)
The condition (133), along with the condition (z0, w0) /∈ Ω, define the set of
initial positions
Ω+ = {(z0, w0) : |w0 + az0| > µeamaxe , w0 + az0 ≥ dµeamaxe }, (135)
for which, subject to (33), the pair (u+p , u
+
e ) is the saddle point in the ERG.
Similarly, by using (85), (125), the condition (131), along with the condition
(z0, w0) /∈ Ω, define the set of initial positions,
Ω− = {(z0, w0) : |w0 + az0| > µeamaxe , w0 + az0 ≤ −dµeamaxe }, (136)
for which, subject to (33), the pair (u−p , u
−
e ) is the saddle point in the ERG.
Proposition 3 Subject to the condition (33),
Ω+ = {(z0, w0) : w0 + az0 ≥ µeamaxe }, (137)
Ω− = {(z0, w0) : w0 + az0 ≤ −µeamaxe }, (138)
Proof. Due to (135) – (136), it is sufficient to prove that
d < 1. (139)
By virtue of (134), this means that
G1 detF − νpG22 > 0. (140)
Due to (112), detF = (G1 − νp)G3 +G22, and (140) reads
(G1 − νp)(G1G3 +G22) = (G1 − νp) detG > 0. (141)
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By (32), (33), (65) and (119),
G1 − νp = 1− 1
β
tf∫
0
h2e(t)dt > 0. (142)
Moreover, it was shown that detG > 0, which, along with (142), leads to
(139). This completes the proof of the proposition
✷
7 Saddle Point Solution in the Inequality Con-
straint Game for (z0, w0) /∈ Ω
In this section, we show that the ERG saddle points (u+p (·), u+e (·)) and
(u−p (·), u−e (·)), obtained in the previous section, also are the saddle points
in the RG. To do this, we are based on Lemma 2. In accordance with this
lemma, we consider two auxiliary optimal control problems with terminal
state inequality constraints and for (z0, w0) /∈ Ω. These problems are ob-
tained from the optimal control problem (50) – (52), (28) by replacing there
the pursuer’s control u¯∗p(t) with the controls u
+
p (t) and u
−
p (t), respectively.
7.1 Solution of the auxiliary optimal control problems
with terminal state inequality constraints
Due to the results of (Ioffe & Tikhomirov, 1979), these optimal control prob-
lems have solutions, the optimal controls u¯∗e1(t) and u¯
∗
e2(t), respectively.
7.1.1 Solution of the first problem
We start with the problem (50) – (52), (28) where u¯∗p(t) = u
+
p (t), t ∈ [0, tf ],
and (z0, w0) /∈ Ω. Remember that in Theorem 2 the ERG saddle points
(u+p (·), u+e (·)) was obtained subject to the inequality (126). Therefore, in
this section we assume this inequality to be valid.
Similarly to the proof of Lemma 1 (see the equations (39) – (42)), there
exist the functions λ¯z(t), λ¯w(t) and the numbers λ¯
f
1 ≥ 0, λ¯f2 ≥ 0, such that
˙¯λz = 0, λ¯z(tf) = 2z(tf ), (143)
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˙¯λw = 0, λ¯w(tf ) = λ¯
f
1 − λ¯f2 , (144)
λ¯f1(w(tf)− µeamaxe ) = 0, λ¯f2(w(tf) + µeamaxe ) = 0, (145)
and the optimal control satisfies the equation
u¯∗e1(t) =
1
2β
[
he(t)λ¯z(t) + ge(t)λ¯w(t)
]
, (146)
where z(t) and w(t) are the solutions of (50) – (51), generated by the pair
(u+p (·), u¯∗e1(·)). Note that (143) yields
λ¯z(t) ≡ 2z(tf ). (147)
For the further analysis of the set (144) – (147), the following three cases
should be distinguished: (i) the optimal control u¯∗e1(t) provides the fulfilment
of the equality w(tf) = µea
max
e ; (ii) the optimal control u¯
∗
e1(t) provides the
fulfilment of the equality w(tf) = −µeamaxe ; (iii) the optimal control u¯∗e1(t)
provides the fulfilment of the inequality −µeamaxe < w(tf) < µeamaxe .
Case (i). Since the pair (u+p (·), u+e (·)) is the saddle point in the ERG+,
then in this case the optimal control is u¯∗e1(t) = u
+
e (t), t ∈ [0, tf ]. The value
of the cost functional for this control is J¯e(u
+
p (·), u+e (·)) = J(u+p (·), u+e (·)) −
α
tf∫
0
(
u+p (t)
)2
dt.
Case (ii). Since u∗e1(t) is the optimal control of the problem (104) – (106)
(see Section 6.1.1), then in this case the optimal control is u¯∗e1(t) = u
∗
e1(t), t ∈
[0, tf ]. The value of the cost functional for this control is J¯e(u
+
p (·), u∗e1(·)) =
Je1(u
+
p (·), u∗e1(·)) = J(u+p (·), u∗e1(·))− α
tf∫
0
(
u+p (t)
)2
dt.
Case (iii). In this case, due to (145) and (144), we obtain λ¯w(t) ≡ 0.
Therefore, by virtue of (146)– (147),
u¯∗e1(t) =
1
β
he(t)z(tf ). (148)
Substitution of u+p (t) (see (117)) and u¯
∗
e1(t) into (50) instead of u¯
∗
p(t) and u¯e,
respectively, and the integration of the resulting initial-value problem yield
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the equation with respect to z(tf )
z(tf ) = z0 − (νp, 0)G−1(χ0 + γ+) + νez(tf ), νe , 1
β
tf∫
0
h2e(t)dt.
Subject to the condition (33), this equation has the unique solution
z(tf ) = z¯f1 ,
1
1− νe
(
z0 − (νp, 0)G−1(χ0 + γ+)
)
.
Thus, the control (148) becomes u¯∗e1(t) =
1
β
he(t)z¯f1. Substitution of this
control into (51) instead of u¯e and integration of the resulting initial-value
problem yields w(tf) = w0 + G2z¯f1, where the value G2 is given in (65).
Using this expression for w(tf), one can directly conclude that in Case (iii)
the following inequality is fulfilled:
−µeamaxe < w0 +G2z¯f1 < µeamaxe . (149)
By routine algebra, the inequality (149) is rewritten as
(−1 + 2d)µeamaxe < w0 + az0 < µeamaxe , (150)
where d is defined by (134). By (139), d satisfies 0 < d < 1. Then, −1 <
−1 + 2d < 1, meaning that positions (z0, w0) satisfying (149), belong to Ω.
Thus, for (z0, w0) /∈ Ω, Case (iii) is non-feasible.
Comparing the analysis results of Cases (i) – (iii) and using the equation
(27) and the inequality (126), we directly obtain the assertion.
Proposition 4 Let the condition (33) and the inequality (126) hold. Let
(z0, w0) /∈ Ω. Then Case (i) is valid and u+e (t) is the optimal control in the
first auxiliary problem.
7.1.2 Solution of the second problem
Now, we consider the problem (50) – (52), (28) where u¯∗p(t) = u
−
p (t), t ∈
[0, tf ], and (z0, w0) /∈ Ω. This problem is solved similarly to the optimal
control problem of the previous section. We solve it subject to the inequality
(131). Due to Theorem 3, this inequality provides the pair (u−p (·), u−e (·)) to
be a saddle point in the ERG.
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To formulate the assertion, similar to Proposition 4, we use the following
values of the cost functional J¯(u−p (·), u¯e(·)) in the second auxiliary control
problem:
J¯(u−p (·), u¯−e (·)) = J(u−p (·), u−e (·))− α
tf∫
0
(
u−p (t)
)2
dt,
J¯(u−p (·), u¯∗e2(·)) = z¯2f2 −
z¯f2
β
tf∫
0
h2e(t)dt,
where u¯∗e2(t) = (1/β)he(t)z¯f2, z¯f2 ,
1
1− νe (z0 − (νp, 0)G
−1(χ0 + γ−)) .
Similarly to Proposition 4, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Let the condition (33) and the inequality (131) hold. Let
(z0, w0) /∈ Ω. Then u−e (t) is the optimal control in the second auxiliary prob-
lem.
7.2 Saddle points in the Reduced Game (24) – (25),
(27), (28)
Based on Lemma 2, Theorems 2, 3 and Propositions 3 – 5, we immediately
have the following two theorems.
Theorem 4 Let the condition (33) hold and (z0, w0) ∈ Ω+. Then, the pair
(u+p (·), u+e (·)) is an open-loop saddle point in the Reduced Game.
Theorem 5 Let the condition (33) hold and (z0, w0) ∈ Ω−. Then, the pair
(u−p (·), u−e (·)) is an open-loop saddle point in the Reduced Game.
Remark 9 Remember that in Section 3 the following result was obtained. If
the condition (33) holds and (z0, w0) ∈ Ω, then the pair
(
u0p(·), u0e(·)
)
is an
open-loop saddle point in the Reduced Game (24) – (25), (27), (28). Since
the planar sets Ω, Ω+ and Ω− do not intersect each other, and Ω ∪Ω+ ∪Ω−
coincides with the entire (z0, w0)-plane, then the above mentioned result of
Section 3 and Theorems 4 – 5 represent the complete open-loop saddle-point
solution of the Reduced Game.
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8 Special Case: First-Order Pursuer against
First-Order Evader
In this section, the theory of the previous sections is applied to the particular
case of (1) – (2) which is of a practical interest. This example illustrates some
important features of the game solution.
8.1 Original Game OG
If both the pursuer and the evader have the first-order dynamics controller,
then in the system (1) – (2), np = 1, A¯p = −1/τp, b¯p = 1/τp, d¯p = 0, ne = 1,
A¯e = −1/τe, b¯e = 1/τe, d¯e = 0, where τp and τe are the time constants of
the pursuer’s and the evader’s controllers. The pursuer’s and the evader’s
controls are the lateral acceleration commands.
In the OG, the controlled system is given by (7), where, by virtue of (4)
– (6) and (8) – (9), x = (yp, y˙p, ap, ye, y˙e, ae)
T ,
A =

0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 −1/τp 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 −1/τe
 , B =

0
0
1/τp
0
0
0
 , C =

0
0
0
0
0
1/τe
 .
The cost functional (10) becomes
J = (x4(tf)− x1(tf))2 + α
tf∫
0
u2p(t)dt− β
tf∫
0
u2e(t)dt.
The matrix Φe, given by (13) – (14), is
Φe(tf + tc, t) =
 1 tf + tc − t −τ 2e ψ((tf + tc − t)/τe)0 1 τe[exp(−(tf + tc − t)/τe)− 1]
0 0 exp(−(tf + tc − t)/τe)
 ,
where ψ(t) , exp(−t) + t− 1 ≥ 0.
Thus, the terminal inequality constraint (16) becomes
|x4(tf) + tcx5(tf )− τ 2eψ(tc/τe)x6(tf)| ≤ µeamaxe ,
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where
µe = τe
tf+tc∫
tf
ψ((tf + tc − t)/τe)dt =
τ 2e (1− σ + σ2/2− exp(−σ)), σ , tc/τe. (151)
8.2 Reduced Game
In this example, Dep = [1, 0, 0, 0] and the matrix Φep, introduced in (20), is
Φep(t, τ) =

1 t− τ −τ 2pψ((t− τ)/τp) τ 2eψ((t− τ)/τe)
0 1 τp[exp(−(t− τ)/τp)− 1] −τe[exp(−(t− τ)/τe)− 1]
0 0 exp(−(t− τ)/τp) 0
0 0 0 exp(−(t− τ)/τe)
 .
Thus, the scalar variables (20) and (23) become
z(t) = ye − yp + (tf − t)(y˙e − y˙p)− τ 2pψ((tf − t)/τp)ap + τ 2eψ((tf − t)/τe)ae,
w(t) = ye + (tf + tc − t)y˙e + τ 2eψ((tf + tc − t)/τe)ae.
The coefficient functions (26) in the differential equations (24) – (25)
become
hp(t) = −τpψ((tf − t)/τp), he(t) = τeψ((tf − t)/τe), (152)
ge(t) = τeψ((tf + tc − t)/τe). (153)
The differential equations (24) – (25) become
z˙ = −τpψ((tf − t)/τp)up + τeψ((tf − t)/τe)ue, (154)
w˙ = τeψ((tf + tc − t)/τe)ue. (155)
The Reduced Game (RG) is formulated for the system (154) – (155) with
the cost functional (27) and the terminal inequality constraint (28) where µe
is given by (151).
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8.3 Unconstrained Reduced Game
In the Unconstrained Reduced Game (URG), the optimal controls (34) are
u0p(t) =
τpψ((tf − t)/τp)z0
αs
, u0e(t) =
τeψ((tf − t)/τe)z0
βs
, where s is defined by
(32) by substituting hp(t) and he(t) from (152). The solvability condition
(33) reads
β > β∗ = τ 2e
tf∫
0
ψ2((tf − t)/τe)dt, (156)
yielding s > 0.
Remark 10 By comparing (36) and (65), the coefficient a in the definition
(37) of the set Ω writes as a = −G2
G1
.
To illustrate numerically the above presented results, we choose tf = 1
s, ν = 0.9, amaxe = 100 m/s
2, β = 0.3, τp = 0.2, τe = 0.1 s. For these
parameters, β∗ = 0.2438, and the solvability condition (156) is valid.
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Figure 2: URG solution
In Fig. 2a, the set Ω, given by (37), is shown for α = 0.001, α = 0.05
and α = 0.1 (a = 0.017, a = 0.92 and a = 1.98, respectively). In this
numerical example, tc = 0.9 s, µc = 0.325 and the terminal constraint (28)
is |w(tf)| ≤ 32.5. In Fig. 2b, two optimal w-trajectories are shown for
α = 0.05 and different initial conditions. If the game starts from (z0 =
100, w0 = −50) ∈ Ω, then w(tf) = 4.895 m satisfies the terminal inequality
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constraint (the trajectory is shown by the solid line). If the initial position is
(z0 = 100, w0 = −100) /∈ Ω, w(tf) = −45.105 m and the terminal constraint
is violated (dashed-line trajectory). The dotted lines depict the boundaries
±µeamaxe = ±32.5 m.
8.4 Equality Constraint Games
Consider the Equality Constraint Games, ERG+ and ERG−, for the same
parameters as in the previous subsection, α = 0.05, (z0, w0) = (100,−100) /∈
Ω. In this numerical example,
G =
[
3.72 2.04
−2.04 5.91
]
, b+ =
[
100
−132.5
]
, b− =
[
100
−67.5
]
,
ω+f =
[
z+f
v+f
]
=
[
32.92
−11.05
]
, ω−f =
[
z−f
v−f
]
=
[
27.85
−1.80
]
,
where the vectors ω+f and ω
−
f are defined in (75) and (86), respectively. The
matrices G˜, G¯ and the vectors χ0, γ
+, γ−, defined in (76), (79), (80), (81)
and (86), respectively, are
G˜ =
[
3.72 2.04
2.04 −5.91
]
, G¯ =
[
0.23 −0.08
−0.08 −0.14
]
, χ0 =
[
100
−100
]
, γ± =
[
0
∓32.5
]
.
Thus, the game values of the ERG+/ERG−, given in (74), (78) and (85),
respectively, are (J+)∗ = 1821.6, (J−)∗ = 2659.1.
In Fig. 3, the optimal trajectories in the games ERG+ and ERG− are
shown: two z-trajectories (Fig. 3a) and two w-trajectories (Fig. 3b), gen-
erated by the saddle-point pairs (u+p , u
+
e ) and (u
−
p , u
−
e ), respectively. It is
seen that in the ERG+, w(tf) = µea
max
e = 32.5 m, whereas in the ERG
−,
w(tf) = −µeamaxe = −32.5 m, i.e., the equality terminal constraints (90) and
(99) are valid, meaning that u+e (·) ∈ U+e and u−e (·) ∈ U−e . Moreover, in the
ERG+, z(tf ) = z
+
f = 32.92 m, whereas in the ERG
− z(tf ) = z−f = 27.85
m, i.e. the terminal conditions (92) and (100) hold. The respective optimal
controls u±p and u
±
e are shown in Figs. 4a and 4b, respectively.
In order to illustrate the saddle-point inequality (88), let us choose a
constant strategy ue = u¯
+
e ≡ const ∈ U+e , i.e., satisfying
w(tf) = w0 + u¯
+
e
tf∫
0
ge(t)dt = µea
max
e . (157)
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Figure 3: ERG+ and ERG− optimal trajectories
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Figure 4: ERG+ and ERG− optimal controls
For the parameters of this subsection, u¯+e = 101.92. It is calculated that
J(u+p (·), u¯+e ) = 1358.4 < (J+)∗ = 1821.6 = J(u+p (·), u+e (·)). For up(t) =
400(t− tf), J(up(·), u+e (·)) = 2369.3 > (J+)∗. Thus the saddle-point inequal-
ity (88) is valid.
Due to (72), the optimal ERG+-strategies u+p (·) and u+e (·) are the point-
wise limits of the respective optimal UPG+ε -strategies u
+
pε(·) and u+eε(·). In
Fig. 5, the difference functions ∆u+pε(t) = |u+p (t) − u+pε(t)| (Fig. 5a) and
∆u+eε(t) = |u+e (t)−u+eε(t)| (Fig. 5b) are shown for decreasing values of ε. The
pointwise convergence is well seen.
Figs. 6 illustrate the convergence of the values z(tf ) and w(tf) on the
optimal trajectories in the games UPG±ε to the terminal conditions z(tf ) = z
±
f
and w(tf) = ±µeamaxe in the games ERG±. The values of w(tf) and z(tf )
are shown as functions of ε in Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b, respectively. In Fig.
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Figure 5: Convergence of UPG+ε to ERG
+: optimal controls
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Figure 6: Convergence of UPG±ε to ERG
±: terminal boundary conditions
7, the values of the games UPG+ε and UPG
−
ε are depicted as functions of ε,
demonstrating the convergence to the values of the games ERG+ and ERG−,
respectively.
8.5 Equality Constraint Game ERG
We continue using the same parameters as in the previous subsections. Re-
member that in this example, a = 0.92, µea
max
e = 32.5. Due to Proposition
3, the pair (u+p (·), u+e (·)) constitutes the saddle point in the ERG if and
only if (z0, w0) ∈ Ω+ = {w0 + 0.92z0 ≥ 32.5} (see Fig. 8a). Similarly, for
(z0, w0) ∈ Ω− = {w0 + 0.92z0 ≤ −32.5} the saddle point in the ERG is
(u−p (·), u−e (·)) (see Fig. 8b).
Let us chose the initial position (z0, w0) = (100, 50) ∈ Ω+ and calculate
the cost functional (27) for three pairs of control functions: for (u+p (·), u+e (·)),
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Figure 8: The sets Ω+ and Ω−
for (u+p (·), u−e (·)) and for (u−p (·), u+e (·)). Similarly, for (z0, w0) = (−100,−20) ∈
Ω− we calculate (27) for (u−p (·), u−e (·)), for (u−p (·), u+e (·)) and for (u+p (·), u−e (·)).
The results are presented in Table 1.
It is seen that for (z0, w0) ∈ Ω+, the saddle point inequality
J(u+p (·), u−e (·)) < J(u+p (·), u+e (·)) < J(u−p (·), u+e (·))
is satisfied for (u+p (·), u+e (·)). For (z0, w0) ∈ Ω−, the saddle point inequality
J(u−p (·), u−e (·)) < J(u−p (·), u−e (·)) < J(u+p (·), u−e (·))
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Table 1: ERG Results
(z0, w0) ∈ Ω+ (z0, w0) ∈ Ω−
Controls Result Controls Result
(u+p (·), u+e (·)) 1939.2 (u−p (·), u−e (·)) 2488.2
(u+p (·), u−e (·)) 418.8 (u−p (·), u+e (·)) 1463.1
(u−p (·), u+e (·)) 2347.7 (u+p (·), u−e (·)) 2836.7
is satisfied for (u−p (·), u−e (·)).
Due to Theorems 4 – 5, for (z0, w0) ∈ Ω+, the saddle point in the Reduced
Game is (u+p (·), u+e (·)), whereas, for (z0, w0) ∈ Ω−, it is (u−p (·), u−e (·)).
9 Conclusions
A defender-attacker-target problem with non-moving target was modeled
by a pursuit-evasion finite horizon linear-quadratic differential game with a
terminal inequality constraint. In this game the pursuer models the defender,
while the evader models the attacker. The game was solved in the following
two cases: (1) the transfer functions for the players’ controllers are of any
orders, and (2) the transfer functions for the players’ controllers are of the
first-order. The cost functional of the game is a weighted sum of the square of
the final range between the players, and integrals of the squares of the players’
controls. The objective of the pursuer is to minimize the cost functional,
while the evader has two objectives: (1) to maximize the cost functional,
and (2) to hit the non-moving target. The second evader’s objective yields
an inequality constraint, imposed on the evader’s position at the final time
instant of the game.
For an unconstrained version of this game, the necessary and sufficient
condition, guaranteeing the slackness of the terminal constraint, was derived.
This condition yields the decomposition of the state space of the game into
two non-intersecting regions, in the first of which the original game is equiv-
alent to the unconstrained game. The open-loop saddle point solution of this
game was obtained.
For the original game, considered in the second region, the condition
of its equivalency to a linear-quadratic differential game with a terminal
state equality constraint was obtained. The latter game is decomposed into
two subgames with simpler terminal state equality constraints. For each of
43
these subgames an open-loop saddle point solution was derived based on the
penalty function method with a quadratic penalty function and a penalty
coefficient tending to infinity. Using these subgames’ solutions, conditions
for the existence of open-loop saddle point solutions to the original game
in the second region were derived and the saddle points themselves were
obtained.
Being the solution in open-loop controls, these results are rather theo-
retic. The future issues of the topic, requiring further investigations, are (i)
based on the open-loop solution, to solve the considered game in feedback
strategies which is not only of a theoretical interest but also of a practical
implementation; (ii) by numerical simulation, to analyse how the game pa-
rameters (especially, the penalty coefficients α and β) influence the control
bounds.
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